The Amistad Case Part II

This case is not only one of deep interest in itself, as affecting the destiny of the unfortunate Africans whom I represent, but it involves considerations deeply affecting our national character in the eyes of the whole civilized world ~ from Roger Baldwin's closing argument.

Roger's closing argument

After suffering some embarrassment over losing his temper in the House, John Q. Adams had requested that our cousin Roger Baldwin (5C7X) make the opening statement in the case. Roger made his opening statements on February 22, 1841. The prosecution and defense then presented their cases over the next two days. Roger ended the second day with his final argument:

May it please your Honors,--

In preparing to address this honorable Court. . .in behalf of the humble Africans whom I represent, -- contending, as they are, for freedom and for life, with two powerful governments arrayed against them, -- it has been to me a source of high gratification, in this unequal contest, that those questions will be heard and decided by a tribunal, not only elevated far above the influence of Executive power and popular prejudice, but from its very constitution exempt from liability to those imputations to which a Court, less happily constituted, or composed only of members from one section of the Union, might, however unjustly, be exposed.

In a case like this, involving the destiny of thirty-six human beings, cast by Providence on our shores. . . it is much to be regretted that attempts should have been made in the official paper of the Government, on the eve of the trial before this Court of dernier resort, to disturb the course of justice, not only by passionate appeals to local prejudices, and supposed sectional interests, but by fierce and groundless denunciation of the honorable Judge before whom the cause was originally tried. . . and, as if this were not enough, that two miserable articles from a Spanish newspaper, denouncing these helpless victims of piracy and fraud, as murderers, and monsters in human form, should have been transmitted by the minister of Spain to the Department of State, and published in an Executive communication to the Senate, on the very day on which the hearing commenced in this honorable Court.

This case is not only one of deep interest in itself, as affecting the destiny of the unfortunate Africans whom I represent, but it involves considerations deeply affecting our national character in the eyes of the whole civilized world, as well as questions of power on the part of the government of the United States, which are regarded with anxiety and alarm by a large portion of our citizens. It presents, for the first time, the question whether that government, which was established for the promotion of JUSTICE, which was founded on the great principles of the Revolution, as proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence, can, consistently with the genius of our institutions, become a party to proceedings for the enslavement of human beings cast upon our shores, and found in the condition of freemen within the territorial limits of a Free and sovereign State?

Roger then laid out the history of the case:

. . .the Africans, who, when seized, were in the condition of freemen, capable of having and enforcing rights of their own, severally answered: that they were born free, -- and were kidnapped in their native country, and forcibly and unlawfully transported to Cuba; -- that they were wrongfully and fraudulently put on board of the Schooner Amistad by Ruiz and Montez, under color of permits, fraudulently obtained and used; that after achieving their own deliverance they sought an asylum in the State of New York, by the laws of which they were free; and that while there, they were illegally seized by Lieutenant Gedney, and brought into the District of Connecticut.

The District Court found these allegations in substance to be true. . .From the finding and decree of the District Court, neither Ruiz nor Montez, nor Gedney have appealed. They voluntarily sought, by their libels, the action of the Court, and submitted to the decision against them. They might have appealed, but chose not to avail themselves of the privilege.

The Counsel for the Africans move the Court to dismiss this appeal, on the ground that the Executive Government of the United States had no right to become a party to the proceedings against them as property. . .

. . .why should this Government be required to become active in their restoration? They appear here as freemen. They are in a State where they are presumed to be free. They stand before our courts on equal ground with their claimants; and when the courts, after an impartial bearing with all parties in interest before them, have pronounced them free, it is neither the duty nor the fight of the Executive of the United States to interfere with the decision.

It may comport with the interest or feelings of a slave State to surrender a fugitive slave to a foreigner, or at least to expel him from their borders. But the people of New England, except so far as they are bound by the compact, would cherish and protect him. To the extent of the compact we acknowledge our obligation, and have passed laws for its fulfillment. . .

No state in this Union regards them as property. As the victims of piracy they are entitled to their freedom when imported by our own citizens, and no principle of comity can require us to regard them as property when claimed by foreigners.

By the law of the State of New York, a foreign slave escaping into that state becomes free. And the Courts of the United States in acting upon the personal rights of men found within the jurisdiction of a free state, are bound to administer the laws as they would be administered by the state courts, in all cases in which the laws of the state do not conflict with the laws or obligations of the United States, the law of nature, or the law of God.

In this case the wrongful act was done to the Africans, by the seizure of them by Lt. Gedney without warrant or authority. An officer of the United States is not invested with the power of seizing the person of a citizen or a stranger, unless he has committed some crime for which he is liable to be punished by the Courts of the United States.

But they were not pirates, nor in any sense hostes humani generis. Cinque, the master-spirit who guided them, had a single object in view. That object was -- not piracy or robbery -- but the deliverance of himself and his companions in suffering, from unlawful bondage. They owed no allegiance to Spain. They were on board of the Amistad by constraint. Their object was to free themselves from the fetters that bound them, in order that they might return to their kindred and their home. In so doing they were guilty of no crime, for which they could be held responsible as pirates.

It is admitted and proved in this case that these negroes are natives of Africa, and recently imported into Cuba. Their domicil of origin is consequently the place of their birth in Africa.

That these victims of fraud and piracy, -- husbands torn from their wives and families, -- children from their parents and kindred, -- neither intended to abandon the land of their nativity, nor had lost all hope of recovering it, sufficiently appears from the facts on this record.

But we do not rest the case here. . .On the 14th of May, 1818, the Spanish Government announced to the Government of the United States that the slave trade was prohibited by Spain. . .By the ordinance of the King of Spain of December, 1817, it is directed that every African imported into any of the colonies of Spain in violation of the treaty, shall be declared free in the first port at which he shall arrive.

. . .upon what plausible ground can it be claimed by the Government of the United States, that they were slaves in the island of Cuba, and are here to be treated as property, and not as human beings?

The only evidence exhibited to prove them slaves are the papers of the Amistad, giving to Jose Ruiz permission to transport 49 Ladinos belonging to him from Havana to Puerto Principe; and a like permit to Pedro Montez to transport three Ladinos. For one of the four Africans, claimed by Montez (the boy Ka-le) there is no permit at all.

These permits or passports are in the printed custom-house form, which are evidently prepared for the purpose of giving a particular description of the individuals for whom they are intended. . .They are neither individually identified, nor do they collectively answer the description of the persons whom Ruiz and Montez were authorized to transport.

The permits were for Ladinos,--a term exclusively applied to Africans long resident in the island,--acclimated, and familiar with the language of the country.

But the Africans of the Amistad are bozals, and not Ladinos:--a fact which is not only proved by the testimony of the witnesses, but is distinctly admitted on the record, in the admission "that they are natives of Africa and recently imported into Cuba."

Such papers, given on the simple application of the party requesting them, and payment of the customary fees--could never be conclusive upon the rights of strangers. . .The claim that they are so, in the present case, is preposterous. . .

These Africans were not only "recently imported," but Ruiz and Montez knew it, when they obtained their permits for Ladinos.

The inference then is irresistible, either that they concealed the fact, fraudulently, from the custom-house officer who granted the permits, and falsely represented the negroes whom they intended to ship, to be Ladinos; or that the custom-house officer, knowing the truth, gave them a false certificate, and was himself a party to the fraud.

Time admonishes me that the usual hour of adjournment has arrived, and that I have, perhaps, already occupied too long the attention of the Court. But the destiny of thirty-six human beings depends upon the decision; and the peculiar circumstances of their case, and the questions of power, which are involved in it, have excited an intense interest throughout the country; -- I may almost say throughout the civilized world. . .It is because of the magnitude of the principles involved in this discussion, and the extraordinary claims and proceedings of the Executive department. . .that I have felt myself at liberty to make larger demands on the patience of the Court, than I should otherwise have deemed proper. And it is to the same considerations we owe it, that the illustrious citizen (John Q. Adams) with whom I have the honor to be associated on this occasion, -- after enjoying the highest honors that this or any other country can bestow, deems it a still higher object of his ambition, to appear before this tribunal to plead the cause of helpless strangers who have been thrown by Providence upon the hospitality of this nation, and, at the same time in the name, and I trust as the representative of the American people, to vindicate the honor of our country and the claims of humanity and justice.

Adams' argument and the judgment

The next day, February 23, John Adams gave his closing statement in the Supreme Court chambers. He spoke for four and a half hours, "discoursing at length on the humanity and natural rights of the slaves." One of the justices, Philip Barbour died unexpectedly that night and the court was recessed until March 1 when Adams continued his statement. He spoke for another four hours, several times pointing to the Declaration of Independenceand asserting "that the Africans were entitled to all the rights and freedoms embodied in the 'Law of Nature and of Nature’s God on which our fathers placed our national existence.'"

In the end, however, it was Roger's arguments that the Court found convincing. "Many points" in Adams lengthy speech "were not considered by the Court essential to its decision: and were not taken notice of in the opinion of the court." The Court ruled 7 to 1 to "recognized the status of the Africans as free persons." Senior Justice Joseph Story wrote and read the decision: "...it was the ultimate right of all human beings in extreme cases to resist oppression, and to apply force against ruinous injustice."

The sole dissenter in the case was our cousin Henry White Baldwin (6C7X). We wrote about Henry in our "Complicated Statesman Henry White Baldwin" post.

Thirty five of the fifty Africans were returned to their homeland. The others either died at sea or in prison while awaiting trial.

after Amistad

In 1844, Roger began his term as governor of the state of Connecticut, an office he held until 1846. In 1847, he was appointed to fill a vacancy in the U.S. Senate and in 1848, he was elected to that position which he held until 1851.

In all of Roger's years as a public servant, however, he is most known for his fight against slavery. From the Museum of Connecticut wesite:

He spoke out against measures such as the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Some of his positions upset Whig leaders in Connecticut, and since U.S. Senators were then chosen by the General Assembly, Baldwin was not elected again after 1851. He returned to New Haven and continued his law practice, becoming one of the highest paid lawyers in the state. He helped form Connecticut’s Republican Party and supported Abraham Lincoln’s nomination in 1860. In 1861, Baldwin served as a delegate to the National Peace Conference in Washington, D.C. The Conference was convened by the Virginia General Assembly as a final effort to avert the country from being embroiled in the Civil War. It was his last public service.

Roger died in New Haven in 1863 at the age of 70.